The Principle of Legality: Protecting Rights in Australia

By Siddarth Sethi

In April 2010, the Australian government released its Human Rights Framework, a formal response to the  recommendations  proposed  by the National Human Rights  Consultation chaired  by  Father  Frank  Brennan  AO.  The  Framework  adopted  many  of  the recommendations  put  forth  by  the  Brennan  Committee’s  Report,  including  increasing efforts to educate Australians about their rights, and about the nature of rights protection in  Australia  generally.  However,  the  Australian  government  rejected  the  Committee’s primary recommendation to adopt a statutory bill of rights, or Human Rights Act, modeled on  existing  state  and  territory  legislation  already  operating  in  the  Australian  Capital Territory  and  Victoria.  Due  to  the  lack  of  federal  legislation,  the  judicial  statutory interpretation  principles,  particularly  the  principle  of  legality,  remain  the  primary mechanisms of rights protection in Australia. [1]

Recent High Court decisions including that of Plaintiff S10/2011 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (‘Plaintiff S10’) suggest that the power of these mechanisms to prevent the government  from  rescinding  fundamental  common  law  rights  has  waned.  [2][1]Additionally, the changes to section 18C of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 proposed by the  Abbott  government have  highlighted  concerns  surrounding  the  balance  of  federal rights  protection  mechanisms  and  the  maintenance  of  satisfactory  checks  on  legislative power.  Given  the  current  political  climate,  whether  the  current  principle  of  legality provides adequate rights protection or whether something more, such as the statutory bill of  rights  suggested  by the Brennan Committee,  is needed  has  become  increasingly  more important.

The  judicial  principle  of  legality  refers to the  presumption that the  courts will  approach legislation  in  a  manner  consistent  with  fundamental,  or  common  law,  rights  unless parliament  explicitly  states  otherwise. [3] This  principle  has  a  long  history  in Australian 
public law, dating back to the seminal High Court case of Potter v Minahan. [4] Mr. Minahan, was born in Australia but left Australia with his Chinese father at the age of five. Upon his return twenty‐six  years  later, the  Court was  faced  with  determining  whether,  under the Immigration Restriction Act 1901 (Cth), he was an immigrant. The Court  ruled that the right of an Australian‐born person to enter Australia was fundamental, and could only be revoked if the contrary were explicitly stated in a piece of legislation. Due to the absence of 
such statements in the relevant Act, Mr. Minahan was not considered an immigrant. Justice O’Connor  captures  the  essence  of  this  principle  in  Australian  public  law  in  his  opinion, stating that the Court does not recognize implicit restrictions on rights: 

‘It is in the last degree improbable that the legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights, or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness; and to give any such effect to general words, simply because they have that meaning in their widest, or usual, or natural sense, would be to give them a meaning in which they were not really used.’ [5]

The principle of legality strives to protect implicit rights by giving the courts the power to scrutinize  legislation,  and  to  determine  whether  it  is  consistent  with  fundamental,  or common law, rights. Therefore, such protections depend greatly upon the discretion of the courts. Recent High Court decisions  suggest that  court  sentiments have  shifted, placing a greater emphasis on deriving the legislation’s purpose from the text. This has altered the judiciary’s  approach  to  the  question  of  whether  a  certain  right  is  to  be  abrogated  or protected by legislation. Where previously the courts identified the affected right first and then determined whether the legislation intended to rescind it, the courts now determine the legislation’s purpose first, and then determine whether the protection of the  relevant right falls within its scope. [6]

This  change in  approach is  significant for two main  reasons. First, it  restricts the  courts’ ability  to  scrutinize  legislation  and  ensure  its  consistency  with  common  law  rights.  The new  methodology  shifts  the  balance  of  rights  protection  towards  the  legislative  branch, weakening the judiciary’s power to hold the legislature accountable. Second, and somewhat related, the shift in approach means that the government may not need to explicitly state an intention to abrogate the relevant rights; instead, the abrogation may be inferred from extrinsic material, allowing for more exceptions to the principle of legality. 

Comparing the  defining  issues  in  Plaintiff S10 and  Saeed v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (‘Saeed’) emphasizes these concerns. [7] Both cases relate to the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)  and  whether  the  Minister  for  Immigration  and  Citizenship  was  required  to afford  the  plaintiffs  natural  justice  or  procedural  fairness  when  exercising  his  powers under various sections of the Act.

In Saeed, the Court  ruled that the right to natural justice was a fundamental  right, and in order to exclude it an express statement demonstrating the legislature’s intention to do so was  required.  Due  to  the  lack  of  such  a  statement,  the  plaintiff  was  afforded  the  rights initially denied to him. [8]

Conversely,  in  Plaintiff S10 the  High  Court  ruled  that  the  Minister  was  not  required  to afford the  plaintiffs  natural  justice  or  procedural  fairness  when  determining  whether to grant them visas. This judgment was made despite the lack of express words to that effect in the relevant section of the Act. Instead, the intention of the legislation was derived from extrinsic material‐‐ such as the structure of the Act‐‐ a direct contrast to the court’s view in Saeed. [9]

Although Plaintiff S10 seemingly  signals a shift in the High Court’s approach to questions regarding  rights protection, we have yet to  see whether the High Court will  continue the approach taken in this case. Although this case may not signal a weakening of the principle of legality, it does pose serious concerns regarding the power of the principle. Whether this principle  will  continue to  provide  adequate  protection  for Australians,  or whether  more explicit legislation is needed, only time can tell.

[1] George Williams and Lisa Burton, Australia’s Exclusive Parliamentary Model of Rights Protection, 34 Statute Law Review 58, 61 (2009).
[2]  Will  Sharpe  and  Michael  Palfrey,  Australia:  Cracks  in  the  Principle  of  Legality  in Statutory Interpretation,  Sparkle Helmore Lawyers Blog (Mondaq July 9, 2014) online at http://www.mondaq.com/australia/x/326154/trials+appeals+compensation/Cracks+in+the+principle+of+legality+in+statutory+interpretation (visited November 1, 2014).
[3] Momcilovic v The Queen (2011) 245 CLR 1, [43].
[4] Potter v Minahan (1908) 7 CLR 277, 304.
[5] Id.
[6]  Will  Sharpe  and  Michael  Palfrey,  Australia:  Cracks  in  the  Principle  of  Legality  in Statutory Interpretation (cited in note 2).
[7] Saeed v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] HCA 23 (23 June 2010).
[8] Id at [59].
[9]  Plaintiff  S10‐2011  v  Minister  for  Immigration  and  Citizenship  [2012]  HCA  31  (7 September 2012), [119].

Photo Credit: Flickr User Michael McDonough