The Roundtable
Welcome to the Roundtable, a forum for incisive commentary and analysis
on cases and developments in law and the legal system.
on cases and developments in law and the legal system.
 By Saxon Bryant Saxon Bryant is a Sophomore at the University of Pennsylvania studying Public Policy in Wharton and Political Science in the College of Arts and Sciences. On September 28th 2018, Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Commissioner Scott Gottlieb released a public statement regarding modernizing standards of identity and the use of dairy names for plant-based substitutes. [1] This announcement was accompanied by a request for public comment which closed on November 27th. In other words, the FDA asked the American people, “If milk comes from a plant, should you still be able to call it milk?”
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 By Saxon Bryant
Saxon Bryant is a freshman at the University of Pennsylvania and Associate Editor of the Penn Undergraduate Law Journal. When it comes to due process, we have a flawed assumption as to how a trial by jury can proceed. As commonly understood, the two options presented before the jury are guilty or not guilty. The jury is meant to deliberate on the evidence presented during the trial, and based on that reach one of the two aforementioned verdicts. While simple, this choice does not tell the full story. Jurors have another option they can use. This third option is known as jury nullification. But what exactly jury nullification is and whether or not it’s legitimate has been a subject of debate for hundreds of years. Jury nullification is a jury's knowing and deliberate rejection of the evidence or refusal to apply the law. [1] It occurs when juries render a verdict that is contrary to the evidence and has been a staple of the American judicial and constitutional system for centuries now. The Declaration of Independence gives nullification credence in saying that a government only has legitimate power with “the consent of the governed.” [2] A law which lacks that consent is arguably an improper law. Juries also have a constitutional basis, such as the Sixth Amendment, which grants the accused an inviolable right to a jury determination of his guilt or innocence in all criminal prosecutions. Because of this right, a trial judge absolutely cannot direct a verdict in favor of the State or set aside a jury's verdict of not guilty, "no matter how overwhelming the evidence," as was reaffirmed in Sullivan v. Louisiana (1993). [3] This rule is designed to safeguard what United States v. Spock (1969) defined the jury's power as: intended "to arrive at a general verdict without having to support it by reasons or by a report of its deliberations" and to protect its historic power to nullify or temper rules of law. [4]  By Saxon Bryant
Saxon Bryant is a freshman at the University of Pennsylvania studying Business Economics and Public Policy and an Associate Editor for the Penn Undergraduate Law Journal. The Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) is a joint resolution passed by Congress after 9/11 empowering the president “to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons [the president] determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks,” as well as against those who “harbored such organizations or persons.” [1] Despite being only two pages in length, this document, and a subsequent 2002 AUMF for Iraq, have served as the foundation for U.S. military actions against the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, and the Islamic State. Over the years, various legal experts have pointed out numerous issues with the existing legal framework successive administrations have built using the AUMF. The first relates to questions of constitutional powers. While the president may have certain authorities granted under Article II, the use of force during non-emergencies was meant to be by congressional approval only. [2] This idea is reflected in the 1973 War Powers Resolution, which stipulates that the U.S. president may send U.S. armed forces into action abroad only by declaration of war by Congress. [3] Alternatively, in non-war scenarios, the act requires the president to notify Congress within 48 hours of committing armed forces to military action and subjects the action to congressional approval every 60 days. |
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