The Roundtable
Welcome to the Roundtable, a forum for incisive commentary and analysis
on cases and developments in law and the legal system.
on cases and developments in law and the legal system.
 Warning: This post discusses sexual violence.
By Sandeep Suresh Sandeep Suresh is a recent graduate of the National Law University in Jodhpur, India. Sexual offenses against women have always shocked our collective conscience. In the process of creating sensitivity about such offences against woman, we have not been successful in infusing morality into the society, for morality is something inherent and difficult to be imparted. Unfortunately, in India, the Criminal Justice System has also failed to sensitively deliver justice to the victims of such crimes and to restore their dignity. More specifically, trials of sexual offences in India portray an abysmal state of affairs concerning the way in which victims are treated and evidence is appreciated. This post analyzes two judgments delivered by Special Courts in Bangalore, India specifically designated to conduct rape trials. Both these judgments unfortunately reveal that these Special Courts are not really “Special.” They expose several discrepancies concerning the treatment of victim testimony and methods used to appreciate evidences while deciding a rape case. Undoubtedly, such discrepancies are chiefly due to Special Court judges being insensitive towards the nature of such a heinous crime as sexual offence and being unaware of the binding legal precedents laid down by the Supreme Court of India (SCI).
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 By Sandeep Suresh
The decision in Obergefell v Hodges re-ignited the debate surrounding the United States Supreme Court (SCOTUS) and the extent of its authority. Many, including some Supreme Court Justices, argued that the Court has been overstepping its constitutional authority by legislating from the bench. [1] The sensitivity of the subject matter in Obergefell, the legality of same-sex marriage, enhanced the intensity of the debate, triggering questions of religion, traditions, separation of powers, and state autonomy. The petitioners in the case, several same-sex couples, had filed suits in Federal District Courts in Ohio, Michigan, Kentucky, and Tennessee challenging the constitutional validity of the state laws banning same-sex marriage. The US Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit ruled that the bans on same-sex marriages did not violate the petitioners’ rights under the 14th Amendment’s Equal Protection and Due Process clauses. The appeal against this decision in SCOTUS resulted in Obergefell.  By Sandeep Suresh
Sandeep Suresh is a fifth-year law student at the National Law University in Jodhpur, India. Most major democracies have, at one point or another, had extensive debates regarding their electoral systems due to elections’ integral role in the formation of the skeletal system of a democratic nation. One such aspect of electoral politics that has assumed center stage for debate in the recent past is compulsory voting. The proponents and opponents of compulsory voting have argued from two fronts: the legal front and the logistical front. There have been more arguments against compulsory voting than for it. From a legal and philosophical angle, I would like to argue that compulsory voting would be in the best interests of the society as a whole. The basic essence of my argument is that in a democracy with a well-defined constitution in place, there can never be a situation where only individual rights can be given an upper hand. There has to be a harmonious balance within the constitution with respect to the rights and duties of every citizen. To quote President Barack Obama:  By Sandeep Suresh
Sandeep Suresh is a fifth-year law student at the National Law University in Jodhpur, India. Justice Robert H. Jackson stated in the case of Shaughnessy v. Mezei (1953) that “Procedural fairness and regularity are the indispensable essence of liberty.” [1] Jackson’s commentary captures the great significance of procedural fairness and natural justice. In particular, the impartiality and integrity of arbitrators, although ostensibly simple characteristics, are integral features of arbitration. The right to challenge an arbitrator who does not demonstrate those features, therefore, is essential in assuring the client’s confidence if he or she chooses arbitration as the means of resolving the dispute. The UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (Model Law) recognizes this right. [2] However, what is the result if the challenge procedure itself is unfair and against the principles of natural justice? Article 13 of the Model Law lays down the challenge procedure. [3] The controversial part of the provision is found in Article 13(2): Failing such agreement, a party who intends to challenge an arbitrator shall, within fifteen days after becoming aware of the constitution of the arbitral tribunal or after becoming aware of any circumstance referred to in article 12(2), send a written statement of the reasons for the challenge to the arbitral tribunal. Unless the challenged arbitrator withdraws from his office or the other party agrees to the challenge, the arbitral tribunal shall decide on the challenge. Right to “No Religion”: An Indian Perspective on Taking Secularism to the Highest Pedestal11/10/2014  By Sandeep Suresh
Sandeep Suresh is a fifth-year law student at the National Law University in Jodhpur, India. On September 23rd 2014, a constitutional court of India delivered a promising judgment on the right of an individual to state that he does not believe in any religion and therefore has “no religion.” A few days ago, the United States Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia stated that the American Constitution is only obligated to protect freedom of religion and not freedom “from” it. In that light, this development in India would definitely be an interesting event for the American society to take note of. The judgment under consideration came in the matter of Dr.Ranjeet Suryakant Mohite v. Union of India. [1] The petitioners in this case were members of a registered organization that believed that Jesus Christ did not intend to form Christianity as a religion and hence claimed that they did not have religious faith. The contention in the petition was that the State cannot compel any individual to disclose his religion while submitting government forms or declarations. The petitioners also requested of the court that an individual be allowed to state that he belongs to “no religion.”  By Sandeep Suresh
Sandeep Suresh is a fourth-year law student at the National Law University in Jodhpur, India. Administrative law, which oversees activities of administrative departments of the government, has been gaining popularity as more government agencies were established to manage the augmenting complex social, economic, and political spheres of society. Natural justice principles form a substantial part of this branch of law and apply wherever an administrative decision is involved. Rights and duties in this field are not purely private and are mostly broad in nature with implications for the general public. Understanding the nature of arbitration, in addition to its legal definition, is also necessary. A truly private mechanism of dispute resolution, arbitration is based on party consensus, and only private commercial matters involving in personam rights are adjudicated. Procedural flexibility, which gives parties complete autonomy of deciding the arbitral procedures and place of hearing, provides arbitration the upper edge over court litigation. Arbitrating Competition Law Disputes: Disregarding the Fundamentals for a Pro-Arbitration World3/30/2014  By Sandeep Suresh
Sandeep Suresh is a fourth-year law student at the National Law University in Jodhpur, India. The legal correctness of arbitrating competition law disputes has been thought to be beyond debate after a steady line of case laws affirming the question. This trend has to be seen as a move by countries to make their respective jurisdictions arbitration-friendly. Although the case law jurisprudence is positive, there are certain omnipresent fundamentals that have to be taken into consideration. Typically, either the respective domestic law does not impose any restriction on arbitrating competition disputes or the parties have agreed upon the same. However, this post will look at this issue from the perspective of ‘objective arbitrability,’which studies the suitability of settling dispute through private enforcement. For this purpose, a determined analysis of the nature of competition law disputes and arbitration proceedings is necessary. |
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