The Roundtable
Welcome to the Roundtable, a forum for incisive commentary and analysis
on cases and developments in law and the legal system.
on cases and developments in law and the legal system.
 By Edgar Palomino
Edgar Palomino is a senior at the University of Pennsylvania studying political science. In 2002, wealthy Australian businessman Joseph Gutnick sued Dow Jones and Company Inc. for publications in its affiliated Barron’s magazine. He charged that the article about him published in Barron was defamatory and sued for damages. Gutnick’s lawyers advised him to file the suit in Australia, where it was perceived that individual protections were stronger and the courts more favorable. Dow Jones, an American company, argued that Australian law could not apply to it. However, the court reasoned that Australian law did apply to Dow Jones and Gutnick won his suit. [1] The rationale of the courts was as follows: in order for a plaintiff to claim damages, the allegedly defamatory material must be targeted to their forum state. Mere dissemination across the globe is not sufficient grounds for a suit; the material in question must have been targeted to the forum state of the plaintiff. The forum state is identifiable if the plaintiff has “significant contacts” there; for example, their home, their business, etc. Since the Barron journal had a high number of Australian readers, and since Dow Jones did target Australia, the alleged damages to Gutnick’s reputation and business were deemed valid. Australian law could thus be applied.
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 By Edgar Palomino
Edgar Palomino is a senior at the University of Pennsylvania studying political science. The Internet is ubiquitous in our lives. It is increasingly crucial as an economic and social backbone. It is therefore important to pay some attention to the formation of law concerning the Internet. This series of posts will deal with selected topics in Internet law. The purpose of this initial post is to introduce some thinking about jurisdiction relating to the Internet. In his “Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace”, on Feb. 8, 1996, John Barlow unequivocally argues that the Internet is utterly and wholly separate from the physical world and the governments therein. Therefore, anything can happen on the Internet and have no accountability in the physical world; the Internet is its own sovereign space. What, then, are the laws in this domain? Where does order come from? Barlow insists that the rules of the Internet will be norms, established by webizens amongst themselves. Any issues that arise in the Internet will be dealt with using said norm [1]. Naturally, this view did not find any support among the many nations of the world. That is because it does not make any sense. Sovereign nations should, can, and do have control over the lives and protection of their citizens. Servers reside somewhere. Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin: Another Close Call at Forfeiting a Beautiful America8/2/2016  By Edgar Palomino
Edgar Palomino is a senior at the University of Pennsylvania studying political science. In 2007, Abigail Fisher sued the University of Texas at Austin, arguing that the institution’s consideration of race as a factor in its admissions review process disadvantaged her and other Caucasian applicants . On June 23rd, 2015, the court ruled in favor of the defendant, UT. The majority opinion argues that the ten percent affirmative action plan that UT continues to use is constitutional. However, the majority was hardly overwhelming, with the decision being 4-3 . On the contrary, the dissenting opinions are disheartening to say the least. Justice Thomas and others attacked the notion that diversity at universities had any beneficial effect: “a ‘faddish theory’ that racial discrimination may produce ‘educational benefits’”. Justice Thomas also stated his desire to overrule the ruling in Grutter V. Bollinger (2003). The Grutter ruling reaffirmed the constitutionality of racial considerations as factors in universities admissions processes, so long as the programs fulfilled a “compelling purpose” and was “necessary” to do so .  By Edgar Palomino
Edgar Palomino is a rising senior at the University of Pennsylvania studying political science. Many states require DNA collection from those convicted of felonies, and some states also collect for various misdemeanors. [1] This collection builds a genetic database that can be used to verify a convict’s identity should future crimes occur. However, DNA is also being collected from arrestees that are still presumed innocent. Additionally, there is a trend among states to use the DNA collected from arrestees to search existing databanks for DNA matches with other crimes. While the crime resolving benefits of this method are obvious, the seizure of DNA from arrestees and subsequent matching (and conviction) can be argued to be self- incrimination and thus a violation of the Fourth Amendment. In 2009, Alonzo King was arrested on assault charges and had his inner cheek swabbed for DNA. The DNA was entered into a database and matched with that of a rape kit from years earlier, and King was subsequently convicted for the rape and sentenced to life in prison. King appealed, arguing that at the time of arrest he was presumed innocent of the rape and that the DNA swab thus constituted an unreasonable search and seizure, which violated his Fourth Amendment rights. In 2013, the Maryland Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in favor of King and overturned the previous ruling. This set a precedent for barring the state from collecting DNA when booking arrestees. |
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